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Abstract This paper provides a succinct review of the main developments in the literature
on incentive-based policy mechanisms in the contexts of pollution control and biodiversity
conservation, dating from the early beginnings of the science in the 1960s. A focal point in
the review is on the design features of these policy mechanisms. Key developments in policy
design were originally established in controlling externalities arising from pollution and have
since been extended to policy design tailored towards biodiversity conservation. Special
emphasis is given to the spatial characteristics of the environmental problems underlying
both pollution control and biodiversity conservation. The paper concludes by drawing some
lessons and setting out elements of a future research agenda in both policy domains.
Keywords Environmental policy instruments · Environmental markets ·
Mechanism design · Spatial coordination · Conservation auctions
JEL Classification D44 · D82 · Q57 · Q58
1 Introduction
Incentive-based policy instruments have long been argued by economists to be a more effi-
cient means of achieving environmental goals such as reductions in polluting emissions and
fostering the delivery of ecosystem services (Hanley et al. 2006). Over the last 25years,
governments world-wide have begun to make increasing use of policy instruments such as
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“green” taxes and tradable pollution permits in an attempt to achieve environmental targets in
a more cost-effective manner. One high-profile example is the European Union’s Emissions
Trading System (EU ETS) for carbon emissions. Another is the recently-ended programme
of SO2 credit trading in the U.S. The use of incentive-based policy mechanisms has also
increasingly found its way into policy-making in the area of biodiversity conservation and
ecosystem services delivery. For instance, so-called “payments for ecosystem service” (PES)
schemes have been promoted in the EU 2020 Biodiversity Strategy and have also been imple-
mented in many EU countries as part of a package of agri-environment schemes. However,
applying incentive-based instruments to achieve an improved delivery of ecosystem services
from private land (comprising much of Europe’s forests and almost all of its agricultural
areas) has proved difficult in many cases.
Dating from themillennium ecosystem assessment (MEA2005), the concept of ecosystem
services has dominated public and scientific discussion of the role of “nature” in supporting
human well-being. Exercises such as TEEB (http://teebweb.org) and the UK NEA (http://
uknea.unep-wcmc.org/) have highlighted the types of ecosystem serviceswhich are produced
by the functioning of ecosystems and the biodiversity which they contain; how these services
enhance human well-being, and what their economic value of such benefits might be; and
the factors which explain trends in ecosystem extent and condition over time. The supply of
ecosystem services and biodiversity typically goes unrewarded by market forces owing to
missing markets: private landowners usually receive no direct financial reward for enhancing
or protecting biodiversity, owing to the non-rivalness and non-excludability of these benefits
(Hanley et al. 2006). Indeed, protecting biodiversity typically comes at an opportunity cost
to landowners—for example, if it requires forgoing profitable land conversion or intensifi-
cation. Similar arguments hold for the supply of many ecosystem services. Given the many
market failures which characterize the supply of ecosystem services and the conservation of
biodiversity, scholars have investigated the properties of alternative designs of PES schemes
to partly correct these market failures (e.g., OECD 2010a; Wünscher et al. 2008; Engel et al.
2008; Miteva et al. 2012).
However, the TEEB and UKNEA exercises reveal substantial gaps in our knowledge; not
only over how to value changes in ecosystem services and biodiversity, but also on how to best
design effective PES markets (Banerjee et al. 2013; Polasky et al. 2014). This paper attempts
to shed some light on the main lessons we have learnt from the disciplinary perspective of
environmental and resource economics.1 We review the key literature on how incentive-based
environmental policy can be utilized to encourage the private provision of ecosystem services
and biodiversity conservation.2 However, we will first present a bird’s eye view of the main
incentive-based mechanisms that have been developed in the context of pollution control,
since this was the problem which first shaped economists thinking on the use of incentives
to improve environmental performance in an optimal or a cost-effective manner. Once this
account has been established, we aim at showing how such schemes have been “translated”
for use in the context of biodiversity protection and conservation.
Given the succinct nature of this review, our paper does not aim to provide an exhaus-
tive account of the historical tracks of incentive-based mechanisms in both these domains.
However, by sketching the main policy developments over time in the domains of pollution
control and biodiversity conservation, we aim to provide readers with an impression of the
current status of the literature in order to draw a future research agenda. In Sect. 2 we will
start by sketching the origins and main developments in incentive-based policy mechanism
1 For an earlier, albeit more comprehensive survey of the literature, see Cropper and Oates (1992).
2 See Jack et al. (2008) for an earlier paper reviewing the experience of incentive-based PES schemes.
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for pollution control. Here we will particularly discuss the main properties of (Pigouvian)
taxes and tradeable pollution markets, and will try to establish and identify the current sta-
tus of these mechanisms. This will serve as a stepping stone for the discussion of the main
developments and implementation of incentive-based schemes in the context of biodiversity
conservation in Sect. 3. As we will see, this academic discussion has mainly been centred
around the use of payments for biodiversity protection, including the use of conservation
auctions. Finally, in Sect. 4 we make some concluding comments and suggest some elements
of a future research agenda.
2 Incentive-Based Mechanisms for Pollution Control3
2.1 Pollution Taxes
The idea of a government introducing a tax or subsidy to correct for the presence of externali-
ties is an old one in economics, dating to Pigou’sEconomics ofWelfare in 1920 (Pearce 2002).
Market failure as an explanation for environmental problems is even older in economics, origi-
nating inMarshall’s discussion ofmarket failure relating to fisheries (Gómez-Baggethun et al.
2010). Pigou suggested that governments should introduce a tax, now known as a Pigovian
tax, as an optimal tax on a negative externality. He offered the example of air pollution
in Manchester as a case where externalities of production were creating significant damage
costs on society, andwhere such as tax could improve national well-being. However, there are
massive practical and considerable theoretical problems in using such an optimal pollution
tax (Baumol and Oates 1988).
The idea of bargaining solutions to externality problems, associatedwithCoase (1960), has
long been held up as an alternativemeans of attaining the optimal level of pollution. However,
this concept runs into difficulties as a practical proposition for environmental policy once
multiple parties, cumulative pollutants, free riding and moral hazard are considered. This
meant the field was open to a new and more practical way of pricing pollution.
In the early 1970s, not one but twopractical solutions to the problemof pricing externalities
were proposed. Baumol andOates (1971) showed that an efficient outcome could be achieved
by setting a per-unit tax on polluting emissions. As Baumol and Oates (1988) put it: “A tax
rate set at a level that achieves the desired reduction in the total emission of pollutants will
satisfy the necessary conditions for the minimisation of the programme’s cost to society.”
All that was required for this to be so was for firms to be cost-minimisers, and for a regulator
to be able to identify and then implement the correct tax rate, given its environmental target,
Faced with having to pay a tax, t , on each unit of emissions, the cost-minimizing response
for a firm is to move along its Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curve to the point where
t = MAC. If all firms do this, then marginal abatement costs are equalised across polluters,
a necessary condition for achieving the pollution standard (target) at the lowest aggregate
abatement cost. The tax rate t is set equal to the shadow price of the emissions target, and is
determined both by the severity of this target and the position of the aggregate MAC curve.
If regulators face uncertainty about these MAC functions, and thus about the correct tax
rate, then they need to iterate onto the correct rate: setting a best-guess tax rate, and then
revising this rate up or down dependent on the resultant level of emissions relative to the
target (Baumol 1972). This iterative approach would also be needed where abatement costs
are shifting over time, partly due to technological change, and partly due to changes in prices
3 Note that parts of this section draw extensively on chapter 5 of Hanley et al. (2006).
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of inputs and outputs. However, such an approach to tax setting could impose adjustment
costs on firms (Walker and Storey 1977), and gives forward-looking firms an incentive to
behave strategically, since future tax levels depend on current period emissions for all firms
(Karp and Livernois 1994). Experimental studies have recently tried to establish the overall
welfare effects of such dynamic tax models where the regulator is unsure about what tax rate
to set (see, for example, Vossler et al. 2013).
The original work by Baumol and Oates described above relates to a “uniformly mixed
pollutant”, where damages depend only on aggregate emissions and not their spatial distrib-
ution. However, for many potentially polluting substances, ambient concentrations at a given
monitoring point are dependent not just on the total amount of emissions but their spatial
location too. Targets set for such pollution problems are likely to be in terms of some ambient
measure of pollutant concentrations such as NOX and PM10. The implications for the Bau-
mol and Oates theorem of a non-uniformly mixed pollutant are that a single tax rate will no
longer be efficient, since the tax rate should vary across sources according to their marginal
impacts on ambient air or water quality levels. Suppose that the ambient level of pollution at
any monitoring point j, a j , is a function of emissions from all sources: a j = ∑k d jkek . The
d jk coefficients are often referred to as “transfer coefficients” where there are k = 1, . . . , K
sources and j = 1, . . . , J monitoring points. In the context of water quality, for example,
the transfer coefficient d jk shows the impact of discharges from source k on water quality
at monitoring point j . For non-uniformly mixed pollutants, the regulatory agency’s target
might be specified as
∑
k d jkek ≤ a∗j , where a∗j is the ambient target at monitoring point
j . The regulator’s problem is now to minimise aggregate abatement costs subject to this
constraint. In order to achieve an efficient solution, each firm must face a different tax rate,
which is determined by that firm’s degradation of environmental quality at each monitoring
point (given by the transfer coefficients), and by the ambient target itself, i.e., is equal to∑
j d jkμ j for firm j . As Tietenberg (1974, p. 464) argued: “forcing upwind and downwind
polluters to pay the same tax (can) produce the desired concentration (reduction), but at
a cost which exceeds the minimum cost means of achieving that concentration.” There are
clear links between this finding and the ambient pollution trading idea, which we will discuss
in more detail below.
Another complication relates to non-point source pollution. If nutrient run-off from farm-
land which pollutes waterways is too costly or just impossible to monitor at the farm (source)
level, then one cannot tax actual emissions. One alternative is to tax the inputs (such as fer-
tilizers), which contribute to this non-point source pollution. Common (1977) first showed
that, so long as the “pollution production function” relating inputs to emissions is known,
a desired reduction in emissions can be achieved at least cost by means of a tax on inputs.
However, such pollution production functions may be partly stochastic, and may vary spa-
tially and over time (Aftab et al. 2007). Input taxes may also involve problems when input
substitution occurs if the substitute input has adverse environmental effects.
An alternative tax solution suggested in the literature for non-point source pollution is
Segerson’s (1988) ambient tax. This idea addresses the moral hazard aspect of this kind
of pollution: if a farmer knows that his emissions cannot be monitored and if emissions
reduction is costly, then there is an incentive to shirk on pollution control. The Segerson tax
is composed of two components: a per unit tax or subsidy, which depends on the difference
between actual ambient levels and the target, and a lump-sum penalty, which is imposed
if emissions are too high so that the target is not reached (Hanley et al. 2006, chapter 4).
Alternatively, the scheme can be set up as a situation where each firm faces a tax payment
which is only positive if ambient pollution exceeds a threshold, andwhere the tax rate depends
on the difference between ambient quality and this threshold (Suter and Vossler 2014). The
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threshold for triggering payments can be different from the target level of ambient quality. A
large literature has since emerged on the conditions under which ambient taxes can achieve
an efficient outcome. Part of this literature is addressed to the nature of the damage cost
function, and to the extent of abatement options open to the farmer (Horan et al. 1998). Part
of it relates to the beliefs of regulators and farmers about the relationship between farm-level
land management and emissions, and ambient pollution levels (Cabe and Herriges 1992).
Experimental tests of the consequence of the shape of the damage function, the nature of the
ambient tax schedule and the degree to which farmers communicate with each other include
Suter et al. (2008), who compare linear with non-linear tax schedules. Other approaches to
applying pricing to non-point pollution include estimated emissions taxes, or subsidies for
changes in land/livestock management or land use.
There are now many examples of Baumol and Oates-type pollution taxes in use in envi-
ronmental policy world-wide. These include taxes on inputs, such as fertilizer, pesticide4
and fuel taxes (the latter constituted the biggest single category by value of environmental
taxes in the OECD in 2010); taxes on estimated emissions, such as CO2 taxes, and taxes on
measured emissions, such as the Swedish NOX tax on combustion plants and the NOX tax
in New South Wales, Australia (OECD 2010b). Within the European Union, environmental
tax revenues are dominated by energy and transport taxes (e.g., on freight transport). Many
countries also tax the disposal of solid wastes to landfill sites. What the European Environ-
ment Agency classifies as “environmental tax revenues” have risen slowly in real terms—by
around 19%—since 1995 (EEA 2014). However, no examples exist of the kinds of ambi-
ent damage-weighted schemes described above for non-uniformly mixed pollutants, or of
Segerson-type ambient pollution tax schemes. This may possibly be due to the complexity
of the former and the perceived unfairness of the latter, since the tax liability of individuals
depends on the actions of others, and not just the pollution due to the actions of that individual.
2.2 Tradeable Pollution Permits
An alternative approach to pollution taxes as away of achieving a target reduction in pollution
at least cost is that of tradeable pollution permits (TPPs). This idea originated with Crocker
(1966) and Dales (1968), whilst the original proof of the least-cost property of TPPs is due to
Montgomery (1972). Themain idea behind TPPs is to allocate emission rights andmake them
tradeable. This results in a market for the right to pollute and consequently in the emergence
of a market price for this right. If the permit market is competitive and all possible gains
from trade are realized, this market minimizes the resource costs of achieving a pollution
abatement target. At the outset of the scheme, permits may be issued through grandfathering
or auctioning. In either case, firms are then allowed to trade these permits. We expect firms
with relatively high MACs to be buyers and firm with relatively low MACs to be sellers,
assuming that the initial permit allocation is not cost minimizing. In equilibrium, each firm
equates the permit price, p∗, with itsMAC schedule. For a uniformly-mixed pollutant this is a
necessary condition for individual cost-minimisation across all dischargers. These reactions
by firms move them to their cost-minimising positions and imply differing emission levels
(and emission reductions) across firms, just as with a Baumol and Oates tax.
Fowlie and Muller (2013) and Muller and Mendelsohn (2009) discuss the conceptual
issues around how to designmarket-based regulation for non-uniformlymixed pollutants, and
present contrasting empirical results on the net gains from trade with spatial differentiation.
These gains from differentiation depend partly on the spatial variation in marginal damage
4 Denmark and Norway have levied environmental taxes on pesticides and fertilisers.
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costs. As these authors note, several alternatives to reflect spatial variations in marginal
damage costs were proposed in the early literature. In an ambient permit system, permits
are denominated in units of damage at receptors. There is a separate market in permits at
each receptor, and firms must trade in as many markets as their emissions affect receptors.
Transaction costs would therefore be relatively high.What is more, total emissions can rise as
a result of trading, which may cause knock-on environmental problems such as an increase in
the long-range transport of pollutants (Atkinson and Tietenberg 1987). Allowing for spatial
variation in damages can move a permit market closer to the outcome where marginal costs
per unit of damage reduction are equalised across sources, but at the expense of a potential
increase in transactions costs and a fall in the volume of trading.
Using an optimisation model where the regulator seeks to minimise the sum of damage
and abatement costs (rather than just trying to hit an arbitrary target), Fowlie and Muller
(2013) show that the first-order condition for a socially-optimal allocation of abatement
across sources can be expressed as: c′i (ei ) /c′j
(
e j
) = δi/δ j , where ei and e j are emissions
from firm i and j , respectively, and δi and δ j represent the marginal damages associated
with one unit of emissions from each firm. Thus, in the permit market equilibrium, the ratio
of marginal abatement costs must be equal to the ratio of damage costs across space. Each
firm needs to hold enough permits to validate its emissions as weighted by its own marginal
damage parameter relative to average damages. This outcome can be potentially achieved by
declaring a matrix of trading ratios which show how many units of emissions reduction from
a given source i are equivalent to one unit of emissions from another source j , known as
the “numeraire source” (Muller and Mendelsohn 2009). Muller and Mendelsohn show what
these trading ratios look like for SO2 emissions from a selection of sources in the United
States, and compare the net effects on welfare of introducing such spatial differentiation
into permit trading ratios. However, despite recognition by the U.S. courts that many existing
tradeable permit schemes fail to allow for spatially-varyingdamages, in practice fewexamples
exist of water quality trading markets which use such trading ratios: salinity trading in the
Hunter River basin, Australia, and phosphorus trading in the Minnesota River being two rare
examples (Fisher-Vanden and Olmstead 2013).
Three other issues have emerged in the literature that are worth noting here. First, an
important consideration is whether firms should be allowed to bank or borrow permits across
periods. For instance, a firm could decide to abate more than was required in the present
period, earn credits and then bank these for use in a future period, when perhaps it thought
abatement costs or permit prices would be higher. Allowing the banking of permits has
been argued to be desirable since it can even out spikes in permit markets due to sudden
increases in the demand for an output such as electricity (Ellerman et al. 2003); can act as
a hedge against uncertainty; and can encourage early reductions in emissions. Cason and
Gangadharan (2006) found that prohibiting permit banking and borrowing in the laboratory
resulted inmuchgreater price instability, especiallywhen external shocks (e.g., due toweather
events) are correlated across firms. However, regulators may worry that banking will result
in violations in environmental standards in some time periods. A possible explanation put
forward byCason andGangadharan (2006) for this non-compliance is that firmsmay perceive
that benefits can be reaped from under-reporting emissions, so that unused permits can be
utilized in future periods.
A second design issue relates to the possibility of allowing trade between point and
non-point sources of pollution. For instance, both point sources (such as industrial plants and
sewage treatment works) and non-point agricultural run-off are responsible for severe oxygen
depletion in the northern Gulf of Mexico (Ribaudo et al. 2005). Allowing trades between
these two source types allows for cost-savings in pollution control, since marginal abatement
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costs for point sources were found to be typically greater than marginal abatement costs for
non-point sources. Simulations showed that a net welfare gain of $46 billion was possible
with such trading. However, designing a point-nonpoint pollution trading scheme is complex
(Shortle and Horan 2008; Stephenson and Shabman 2011).
A third issue is that of whether and how to establish a price floor in a permit market,
that is a minimum value below which the market price is not allowed to drop. A recent
criticism of the EU ETS has been that the carbon price has been too low (partly due to
the economic downturn post-2008) to provide a sufficient incentive for firms to invest in
low-carbon technologies (e.g., Burtraw et al. 2010). Price floors can also help to moderate
uncertainty over future permit prices (e.g.,Weber and Neuhoff 2010).Wood and Jotzo (2011)
set out three mechanisms for establishing a price floor. First, the regulator can commit to
buy permits once the price reaches a certain low level. Second, a reserve price can be used
in permit auctions where sales are not made below this price. Third, a price floor can be
established by an additional carbon tax operating alongside a permit trading scheme. Price
ceilings could also be implemented, if there are fears that permit prices could be “too high”.
Related to this is the problem of permit price volatility. A reserve auction can be used
as an alternative mechanism to a price floor to reduce volatility: the regulator keeps back
part of the total permit supply and then auctions this during periods of tight demand (e.g.,
Murray et al. 2009). Price collars, which set a moving ceiling and floor around the current
period permit price have also been proposed as a means of mitigating price volatility, with
the regulator stepping into the market to increase or decrease the supply to influence the
price, or to pay subsidies or impose taxes in addition to the permit scheme. Perkis et al.
(this issue) study price controls in the laboratory, in particular hard and soft price ceilings.
Whilst a hard ceiling does not allow the permit price to rise above an absolute maximum
level, a soft price ceiling is similar to the reserve auction with a minimum reserve price for
permits (see also Fell et al. 2012). Perkis et al’s study shows that hard ceilings are more
effective in controlling permit price fluctuations relative to soft price ceilings, in particular in
the case of a reserve auction with a price floor. From a permit market design perspective the
results indicate that hard ceilings would be the preferred mechanism in view of controlling
permit prices. Furthermore, recent evidence from a laboratory experiment by Stranlund et al.
(2014) suggests that complementing price controls with permit banking can reinforce price
stability in a market environment where permit price fluctuations are driven by abatement
cost uncertainty.
As noted above, tradeable permit markets have become increasingly common for the
control of air pollution in both the U.S. and the EU, but also for the management of some
water quality problems in Australia. Efficient permit market design is much simpler for
CO2 than is the case for non-uniformly mixed pollutants such as SO2 and NOX, since for
uniformlymixed pollutants policy designers do not need toworry about the spatial location of
discharges (aside from cases of pollution leakage, where emissions move outside the political
zone of effective control). This may explain the recent surge in carbon trading schemes (e.g.,
in California), which has occurred despite claims by some economists that carbon taxes are a
better option (e.g., Goulder andSchein 2013). Forwater pollution, successwith permit trading
has been much more limited. The smaller number of potential traders in any catchment as
well as the high spatial dependence of damage costs for most water pollution problems may
be important factors here.5
5 See Jones and Vossler (2014) for a laboratory study analysing institutional design features of water quality
credit trading markets.
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3 Incentive-Based Mechanisms for Biodiversity Conservation
Conservation efforts are often targeted at private landowners, since many valuable ecosystem
services and biodiversity is found on privately-owned land. However, increasing the supply
of ecosystem services and biodiversity typically comes at a cost to these private landowners;
for example, in deciding to protect a wetland rather than convert it to pasture, or in fencing
natural vegetation to protect it from grazing. On the other hand, governments—often the
buyers of biodiversity and/or ecosystem services—typically face uncertainty as to how these
costs are distributed across landowners. Moreover, it is difficult and costly for the buyer to
monitor the actions of landowners if they are offered contracts for undertaking certain land
management actions thought to benefit the environment, such as biodiversity enhancement,
water quality improvement and reduction of eutrophication (nutrient pollution).
In addition to cost heterogeneity, environmental benefits can also vary spatially across
land. The heterogeneous nature of both cost and benefits of land use, and the existence of
information asymmetries between regulators and landowners, makes it difficult for policy-
makers to maximise the net environmental benefits to be delivered by scarce public funds
(Hajkowicz et al. 2007), due to problems of adverse selection and moral hazard (Ferraro
2008; Fraser 2009; White and Sadler 2012).
This setting poses formidable challenges to the design of policy mechanisms in being
both effective and efficient in delivering environmental benefits. Economists have become
increasingly interested in how to incentivize private landowners to change their behaviour in
order to increase the supply of environmental goods and ecosystem services (see Engel et al.
2008). Throughout the European Union, agri-environmental PES schemes have involved the
voluntary opt-in of farmers, who, in return for undertaking a range of management actions,
receive fixed payments on a per-hectare basis for land enrolled (Hanley et al. 2012). However,
the inherent problem underlying such uniform payment schemes is adverse selection, imply-
ing that payment levels might not relate to the actual costs of participation for individual
landowners, who are over-compensated for their participation due to a lack of information on
the part of the regulatory agency regarding the opportunity costs of participation. Moreover,
uniform payment schemes may also not enroll those farmers or landowners who can deliver
the greatest environmental benefits.
The challenge of revealing landowners’ real opportunity costs, in conjunction with
attempts to find ways to increase the environmental benefits delivered by participation,
has resulted in significant advances in the area of policy design in the last two decades.
As mentioned before, maximizing environmental benefits whilst at the same time enhancing
participation of farmers given the inherent differences in their opportunity costs is key in view
of constrained public funds. An important incentive-based mechanism that can potentially
deal with this problem is the conservation auction. Seminal work by Latacz-Lohmann and
Van der Hamsvoort (1997, 1998) showed that auctions can potentially deal with the issues
of adverse selection and lack of cost-effectiveness by promoting price competition amongst
landowners for the supply of non-marketed goods. In conservation auctions, landowners ten-
der bids to a regulatory agency (or some other buyer such as a conservation organization
or water company) indicating their minimum willingness to accept compensation for under-
taking specified conservation actions. The regulatory agency offers conservation contracts
to those bidders whose asking price —weighted by the expected environmental benefits of
their actions—is most cost-effective first, taking on higher and higher bidders up to some
budget constraint or environmental target. Competition with other bidders gives landown-
ers an incentive to moderate their bids, although the fact that the (opportunity) cost of the
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environmental action is unobservable to the government allows landowners to still earn an
information rent (Rolfe and Windle 2011).
Cason and Gangadharan (2004) test-bed the basic conservation auction in the laboratory.
In one of the treatments they vary the auction’s information structure by revealing the potential
benefits of conservation projects to sellers (landowners). Interestingly, relative to a treatment
without providing this information, the overall performance of the auction decreases under
the “full” information treatment. The authors argue that this is due to sellers’ less accurate
representation of the opportunity costs for projects exhibiting high benefits.6 The finding
that information concealment about potential conservation benefits can lead to more efficient
auction performance has recently also been confirmed theoretically by Glebe (2013). Glebe’s
study also demonstrates that revealing such information may attract landholders and can thus
lead to higher participation rates in the auction, hence making the market “thicker”, an issue
to which we will come back later.
Cason and Gangadharan (2004) further show that the pricing rule matters for auction
performance, by comparing a uniform price auction with a discriminatory price auction
where successful sellers are paid a contract sum equal to their bid. Their experiment reveals
that a conservation auction based on a uniform pricing rule results in some sellers being
over-compensated relative to their actual opportunity costs. This result is similar in spirit
to the aforementioned inefficiency resulting from a fixed-rate payment scheme (e.g., on a
per-hectare basis) as applied in many EU agri-environment schemes. As a result, overall
auction performance is improved with a discriminatory pricing rule where the actual price is
offered to individual successful sellers. A similar experimental finding is derived in Cason
and Gangadharan (2005) where a uniform price auction is compared with a discriminatory
price auction in a context of non-point source pollution. In their experiment a discriminatory
auction tends to deliver reductions in non-point source pollution problems more efficiently
than a uniform price auction.7
Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohman (2007) extend this work by testing experimentally how a
discriminatory price conservation auction compares with an equivalent fixed-rate payment
mechanism through the lens of cost-effectiveness, information rents, and economic efficiency.
They do so by distinguishing two auction formats: a budget-constrained auction and a target-
constrained auction. In the former auction type the budget is fixed and given but the target
(outcome) uncertain; in the target-constrained auction the outcome is predetermined but
subject to cost uncertainty. In a static (one-period) market setting the experimental evidence
indicates that both auction formats are superior to the fixed-rate payment scheme in terms of
overall performance. However, in a dynamic setting the auction’s dominance over the fixed-
rate scheme reduces. This means that when sellers have the opportunity to learn from past
decisions and can update their bidding behavior, fixed-rate payment schemes can perform as
well as an auction mechanism.
More recent experimental analyses by Arnold et al. (2013) on budget-constrained dis-
criminatory auctions for conservation reveal that this mechanism may not be able attract the
full set of potential bidders (landowners), implying that auctions can actually induce adverse
6 See Cason et al. (2003) for a more detailed description of the experimental design in the context of non-point
source pollution resulting from agricultural land management, such as fertiliser run-off from fields.
7 Note that this research does not take into account compliance monitoring. In reality monitoring compliance
in agri-environment schemes is often imperfect, resulting in reduced incentives for (some) landholders to
comply with land management changes. This can undermine the delivery of conservation benefits and could
lead to reduced cost-effectiveness of the auction mechanism. In an experimental study, Kawasaki et al. (2012)
find evidence indicating that, in situations where monitoring landholder compliance is imperfect, the uniform
price auction results in overall greater efficiency than the discriminatory price auction.
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selection. This, in turn, can undermine the potential supply of ecosystem services and biodi-
versity from land. Contrasting the auction institution with screening contracts, they further
show by means of laboratory experiments that such contracts may outperform auctions in
terms of social welfare. However, in a dynamic auction experiments where bidders can enter
and submit offers in any period, Fooks et al. (2015) show that such auction institutions are
more efficient relative to a no-auction baseline. This result could imply that dynamic conser-
vation auctions with endogenous entry may result in “bidder selection” over time and induce
bidders to sort themselves into different types. In this respect, allowing for endogenous entry
seems to be an interesting design feature which is of relevance for real markets, as this could
potentially mitigate the adverse selection problem identified by Arnold et al. (2013).
Although competition amongst bidders in conservation auctions can lead to improved cost-
effectiveness, Rolfe et al. (2009) present results from a conservation auction implemented
in an Australian field experiment to study how extending the usual single round auction
to a multiple bidding round auction affects performance. Their study shows that such an
extension allows landowners to learn and obtain more information during the auction. This
is conducive to reducing overall strategic uncertainty, which subsequently leads to a more
efficient outcome. An iterated (multi-round) conservation auction has also been studied by
Reeson et al. (2011), but with the additional design feature of a variable, unknown end
period of the auction. This revealed two results. The first is that, over time, bidders can
observe the location of the other bidders in the landscape. The ability to “observe” bids
reduces uncertainty, which is conducive to steering spatial coordination of land management
actions. Secondly, not knowing when the auction ends reduces rent seeking behaviour as it
encourages subjects to bid more modestly in earlier rounds given subjects will not be able to
revise bids downward from an initial high bid once the auction has ended. Although the study
by Reeson et al. (2011) shows that coordination of landowner behaviour can be “steered” in
the laboratory, these kinds of auctions are still relatively rare in practice. Actual conservation
auction schemes have generally placed relatively little focus on the spatial coordination of
landowner participation in order to improve delivery of biodiversity and ecosystem services
across land. This is because implementing auctions with explicit spatial coordination is
challenging.
Considerable experience in designing and implementing conservation auctions now exists
inAustralia, and analysis shows that facilitating sufficiently high levels of participation is cru-
cial to scheme performance, as is the design of the environmental metric used to weight bids
(Williams et al. 2012). Key features impacting on participation included length of contract,
complexity of legal agreements, payment schedule, monitoring requirements and communi-
cation with potential bidders (Whitten et al. 2013).
An alternative price-based policy instrument that accounts for the dependency between
conservation benefits and spatial connectivity of land parcels is the agglomeration bonus
(Parkhurst et al. 2002; Parkhurst and Shogren 2007). This scheme offers additional payment
to landowners who voluntarily enroll parcels of landwhich lie next to neighbours’ landwhich
is also offered for enrolment. Parkhurst et al. (2002) show that this mechanism inherently
featuresmultipleNash equilibriawhich can ranked in termsof the amount of habitat protected,
the expected returns to landowners, and net social benefits. Test-bedding the agglomeration
bonus in the laboratory, the authorsfind that habitat fragmentation can significantly be reduced
relative to a no-bonus benchmark. Indeed, the experimental results show that subjects were
often able to coordinate on the efficient (contiguous) land reserve. Parkhurst and Shogren
(2007) subsequently incorporate a more explicit spatial target into the basic agglomeration
bonus scheme. Laboratory evidence indicates that the agglomeration bonus is still able to
foster coordination of land management actions but can be more effective depending on the
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type of land reserve targeted (for instance, a corridor style habitat or a single core habitat
style).
Banerjee et al. (2012) extend this seminal work by examining how spatial coordination is
fostered under an agglomeration bonus schemes by varying the group size of subjects (who act
as landowners) in a laboratory experiment. They implement a simple (fixed) circular network
structure but as main treatment vary the size of the network (i.e., different number of farms
in the neighbourhood) in order to test its impact on spatial coordination of landowners and
the scheme’s effectiveness in generating environmental benefits. The experiment indicates a
significant difference in patterns of coordination between groups. In particular, coordinating
land management actions is more difficult in the larger network compared to the smaller
network. Using a similar kind of network structure but without varying the network size,
Banerjee et al. (2014) also identifymultipleNash equilibria in the experimental agglomeration
bonus scheme, which can lead to coordination failure by not reaching the socially optimal
land configuration.However, they show that the information structure available to landholders
has implications for the success of the scheme in delivering environmental benefits in that
revealing the landmanagement choices of a subject’s direct and indirect neighbours enhances
the ability to coordinate to the Pareto dominant equilibrium. The policy message is clear:
fostering market transparency by revealing landowners’ land management actions is likely
to improve the environmental outcome in terms of higher conservation benefits generated
from spatial connectivity and spatial spillovers.
Whilst this research on the agglomeration bonus mechanism is a promising start, current
limitations include the treatment of heterogeneity in landowner and environmental character-
istics, and the assumption of common knowledge of payoffs. Perhaps most importantly, the
current understanding of the agglomeration bonus does not deal with the adverse selection
or (cost) in-efficiency problems since no auction mechanism is used to decide participation.
Given this limited degree of landholder participation, these markets can be relatively “thin”.
A novel incentive mechanism developed by Parkhurst et al. (this issue) to simultaneously
address the issue of landholder heterogeneity and to create a thicker market for habitat con-
servation is called Tradable Set Aside Requirements (TSARs). It builds on the concept of
tradeable development rights (habitat/conservation banking), similar in spirit as a market for
tradeable pollution permits as discussed in the previous section. The main difference with an
agglomeration bonus is that TSARs create an explicit market environment where buyers and
sellers can trade conservation. Parkhurst et al. test-bed the TSARs mechanism both with and
without an agglomeration bonus. The experimental results overall reveal that TSARs are gen-
erally effective in improving the spatial connectivity of habitat. However, when combining
TSARs with an agglomeration bonus, the experimental results reveal a trade-off. While on
the one hand the environmental effectiveness increases due to enhanced habitat connectivity,
the costs are higher compared to the treatment with a TSARs mechanism only.
Two important features highlighted in the aforementioned policy mechanisms is the desir-
ability to foster spatial coordination and allowing for competition between potential suppliers.
Yet jointly achieving these objectives is difficult due to a tension between information pro-
vision, cooperation and competition. One way forward is to explore spatially-differentiated
conservation auctions. However, to enhance environmental outcomes by fostering the con-
tiguity of landholdings, cooperation rather than competition between landowners would
likely be much more effective, since cooperation between neighbouring landowners directly
increases spatial coordination (Windle et al. 2009). So far the existing literature on conser-
vation auctions typically assumes that bids from landowners are independent. That is, the
current generation of conservation auctions do not address the issue of spatial coordination
and do not incorporate the potential synergies across landowners. However, recently Banerjee
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et al. (2015) built spatially adjacent land use management into a conservation auction and
tested it in the laboratory as to how information about the regulator’s spatial objective impact
on subjects’ bidding behavior and subsequent auction performance. Interestingly, although
disclosing information about the spatial features increases rent seeking among participants,
the auction’s overall efficiency is unaffected.
4 Conclusion and Directions for Future Research
This paper has provided a brief overview of the main economic incentives which have been
developed to reduce pollution, to increase the supply of desirable ecosystem services and to
enhance biodiversity conservation.Much of the early literature in pollution control economics
focused on the problems of efficiently regulating point source emissions of local and regional
air and water pollutants, which reflected the dominant environmental concerns of the 1970s.
Increasingly, the focus of the literature has moved to non-point source pollution (which is
now the main cause of low ecological quality in many European and U.S. water bodies) and
to the design of pollution control instruments as part of climate change policies, with the
fast growth of (regional) CO2 markets being particularly important. Price collapses and price
volatility in the carbon market have also promoted recent work on improving the functioning
of permit markets, along with developing a broader understanding of what motivates firms
with regard to their environmental choices rather than the simple cost-minimisation strategies
of the early literature. Finally, a literature is emerging on the optimal design of pollution taxes
when options exist about how to define the tax base (emissions, inputs, outputs) and howmuch
to differentiate taxes across sectors when administrative and abatement costs differ across
sectors and policy choices (Shortle et al. 1998; Smulders and Vollebergh 2015). This involves
a balancing of the gains and losses of greater complexity in policy design for pollution taxes,
which has parallels in the Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) literature with work by
Armsworth et al. (2012).
Indeed, a large body of work now exists on how best to design PES schemes and incentives
which assist in biodiversity conservation. Here, attention is rather on the interaction of one
buyer (typically a government or conservation agency) with multiple potential sellers who
can increase the supply of such environmental goods by changing how they manage land.
One can think here of three main areas of research that still need further investigation.
The first relates to the use of conservation auctions. As has been clear since the late 1990s,
auctions have the potential to achieve considerable gains in efficiency in achieving environ-
mental goals such as restoring native vegetation or reducing non-point source pollution from
farmland. A considerable degree of practical experiencewith implementing such auctions has
now been attained, mainly in Australia and the United States. However, there are a number
of design and implementation issues which require more thought. One is that of achieving
spatial coordination in auctions (Windle et al. 2009), which implies the need for coordination
amongst bidders (e.g., if group bids are rewarded). But this then raises a problem over how
to deal with collusion amongst bidders, since this can lead to the erosion of cost savings
over time. For instance, Calel (2012) studies how a joint bid of a group of landholders can
be integrated into a conservation auction. Although he finds that coordination of landholder
action is improved, auction efficiency is reduced. The second design issue relates to the level
of design complexity and the transactions costs of auctions (increasing complexity can deter
participation). Another design issue relates to bundling of ecosystem services and biodiver-
sity conservation, whereby bidders offer multiple environmental goods for a single price.
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We are not aware of any existing conservation auctions with this feature. However, perhaps
a worthwhile route to explore is to design auctions by drawing upon features of the Higher
Level Stewardship scheme in the UK, where farmers have to offer multiple environmental
improvements on their farm or land in return for a higher payment.
A second avenue of research which is needed relates to the design of conservation sub-
sidies (as distinct from auctions). Some papers are starting to emerge on the properties of
contracts which pay for environmental outcomes rather than management actions and for
contracts which pay for a mix of actions and outcomes (Derissen and Quaas 2013;White and
Hanley, this issue). Paying for environmental outcomes incentivises farmers to produce such
outcomes more efficiently, exploits the private information they hold on species distributions
and abundance on their land, and avoids the regulator having to monitor hard-to-observe
inputs such as conservation effort. However, outcome-based payments transfer risk onto the
farmer and imply costs for measuring environmental outcomes.
A third field of useful future research will lie in the closer integration of ecological mod-
elling and ecological indicators with the design of PES-type incentives. Since the aim of such
incentives is to increase the supply of environmental goods, understanding how this supply is
related to changes in land use and land management is key. Examples include understanding
the spatial variability in ecological response across species to changes in land management
(Armsworth et al. 2012); or the ecosystem production function which generates economic
benefits, an example being the interactions between wild and commercial pollinators with
their ecosystems and with food crops (Ehmke et al. 2015). Environmental metric design
has also been argued to be key to explaining the relative success or failure of conservation
auctions (Williams et al. 2012), but little effort has been made so far in including the proper-
ties of environmental metrics in the optimal design of economic incentives for biodiversity
conservation or ecosystem service supply.
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